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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper uses Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis as an analytical framework for 
understanding the subprime mortgage crisis and for introducing adequate reforms to 
restore economic stability. We argue that the subprime crisis has structural origins that 
extend far beyond the housing and financial markets. We further argue that rising 
inequality since the 1980s formed the breeding ground for the current financial markets 
meltdown. What we observe today is only the manifestation of the ingenuity of the 
market in taking advantage of moneymaking opportunities, regardless of the 
consequences. The so-called “democratization of homeownership” rapidly turned into 
record-high delinquencies and foreclosures. The sudden turn in market expectations led 
investors and banks to reevaluate their portfolios, which brought about a credit crunch 
and widespread economic instability. The Federal Reserve Bank’s intervention came too 
late and failed to usher in adequate regulation. Finally, the paper argues that a true 
democratization of homeownership is only possible through job creation and income-
generation programs, rather than through exotic mortgage schemes. 
 
Keywords: Minsky; Financial Instability; Wall Street; Subprime Mortgages; Real Estate; 
Full Employment; Inequality 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On June 17, 2002, President Bush declared that “There is a home ownership gap in 
America. The difference between Anglo-American and African-American and Hispanic 
home ownership is too big. And we’ve got to focus the attention on this nation to address 
this” (The White House 2002). The goal was to increase minority home owners by at 
least 5.5 million by 2010. In August 2004, the White House produced a document 
surveying President Bush’s achivements. The document stated that “The U.S. 
homeownership rate reached a record 69.2% in the second quarter of 2004. The number 
of homeowners in the United States reached 73.4 million, the most ever. And for the first 
time, the majority of minority Americans own their own homes” (The White House 2004: 
44). Unfortunately, the short-lived increase in homeownership was followed by a record-
high foreclosure avalanche that has pushed the U.S. economy into one of its worst 
financial crises since the Great Depression. Billions of dollars in asset write-downs, rising 
unemployment, sluggish economic growth, and record-high oil and food prices, all of 
which add up to the end of what has been termed “the democratization of 
homeownership.” This fictitious “democratization” was only made possible by a 
combination of factors, namely, three decades of financial deregulation, a very-low-
interest-rate policy by the Fed, an aggressive lending strategy by mortgage companies 
and banks seeking fees and commissions, and a set of financial innovations allowing 
mortgage loan issuers to unload their loan burden onto Wall Street to be securitized and 
marketed without any serious supervision or regulation.  
The argument made in this paper illustrates that the subprime crisis is yet another 
classic Hyman Minsky episode of financial instability. “Stability breeds instability” is a 
famous Minsky slogan, meaning that financial instability and economic turmoil are 
endogenous phenomena that stem from the over-optimistic sentiments and confidence 
that overtake the economy during a boom, leading to lower standards of investment 
evaluations and thinner cushions of safety. Pushing Minsky’s argument a bit further, we 
argue that “inequality breeds instability” as well. The stagnation of real income for 
economically disadvantaged households (typically non-homeowners) combined with 
ever-increasing real estate prices meant that those households would never be able to   3
achieve homeownership. Such households would only be able to buy homes under one of 
the following scenarios: 1) real income rise; 2) real estate prices decline; or  
3) government subsidies (downpayment assistance and low fixed interest rates). 
Unfortunately, the rise in homeownership achieved in 2004 and 2005 was not due to any 
of the above scenarios. The “democratization” of homeownership was nothing but a 
fictitious increase in the demand for homes fueled by innovative financing schemes that 
misled residential real estate developers into increasing the supply of new homes and 
setting up the industry for one of its worst declines in decades. We argue that this 
fictitious democratization of homeownership has turned into a real democratization of 
financial turmoil that has spread beyond subprime borrowers and the herds of lenders 
who serviced them.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the mainstream explanation 
of financial crisis as being the result of “bubbles and irrational exuberance,” and contrasts 
this with a Minskian explanation of endogenous instability. In section III we look at some 
empirical evidence on the mortgage loans serviced, delinquencies, and foreclosures, with 
a particular focus on the East North Central, Middle Atlantic, and South Atlantic regions 
of the United States. Section IV argues that inequality has been the real cause of financial 
crisis and that the subprime lending frenzy was just a temporary patch on inequality in 
which the economically disadvantaged have been used to ride a wave of Wall Street 
speculation. Finally, we conclude that the only viable means of achieving higher rates of 
homeownership and economic stability is through a full employment program that 
secures stable employment opportunities with decent wages and benefits. Under such 
program, all households will have a real and sustainable opportunity for homeownership.  
 
II. MAINSTREAM VS. MINSKIAN EXPLANATIONS OF THE SUBPRIME 
CRISIS 
 
A. The “Bubble and Exuberance” Explanations 
In general, irrational exuberance, mania, or bubbles are the usual mainstream 
explanations of financial instability. These are expression of failure of the agents in the 
system to behave rationally. Financial instability is presented as unusual to the market   4
system, where individuals act rationally. In the current subprime crisis these are offered 
as explanations, too—exuberance on the part of the homeowners who knew they couldn’t 
afford the mortgages they undertook and bubbles resulting from overpricing real estate 
property. Following this logic, the advice is to allow financial markets to learn the hard 
way by letting agents go bankrupt. The presumption is that most of the time there is 
natural stability in the system. 
  Just the opposite is suggested by J.M. Keynes’s analysis of expectations about 
investment returns under uncertainty—the so-called “animal spirits” are a major element 
of the capitalist system. Expenditures on current investment represent an exchange of 
money today for money tomorrow under specific expectations about returns in the future. 
Under conditions of uncertainty, it is only natural that these expectations will be 
disappointed (alternatively we would have rational expectations). Jan Kregel (2007), 
following Keynes, emphasizes the natural instability of financial markets.  
  Similarly, L.R. Wray (2007) points out the importance of going beyond the 
bubble and exuberance explanations of financial instability and looking at the systematic 
conditions embedded in financial markets, including the role of economic policy, in 
validating behavior that enhances financial fragility. 
 
Blaming the “bubble” for the current crisis is rather like blaming the car for an 
accident—when we ought to take a good long look at the driver, and at the 
bartender who kept the whiskey flowing all evening before helping the drunk to 
his car after last call… Unfortunately, those in charge of the financial system 
have for a very long time encouraged a blurring of the functions, mixing drinking 
and driving while arguing that the invisible hand guided by self interest can keep 
the car on course. The current wreck is a predictable result. (Wray 2007) 
 
 
This predictability refers to the socially created conditions in financial markets 
and does not imply that we could deal away with financial fragility, but merely adjust 
through policy and regulation so that the economy does not slip into debt deflation of a 
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B. A Minskian Explanation  
Hyman Minsky’s (1919–1996) financial instability hypothesis is a theory of the impact of 
debt on investment and presents a model of a capitalist economy that doesn’t rely on 
exogenous shocks to generate business cycles. The structure of a capitalist economy 
becomes more fragile over a period of prosperity and an endogenous process leads to 
financial and, consequently, economic instability (Minsky 1992b). 
Charles Whalen (2007) points out the relevance of the financial instability 
hypothesis to the current situation. This interpretation became somewhat visible in 
popular media, specifically in a Wall Street Journal article by Justin Lahart (2007). 
Minsky himself recognized the potential destabilizing effects of securitization as early as 
1986–87 in a previously unpublished note that has been released by the Levy Economics 
Institute (Minsky 1986b, 2008).
1  
  First, real estate appeared to be a good investment, and relatively safe too, 
especially when compared with the dotcom investments. Expansion of lenders’ markets 
into less and less creditworthy borrowers began with “financial innovations” such as 
“interest-only” mortgages and “option adjustable rate” mortgages with low payments at 
the outset, but skyrocketing monthly payments later.  
 Unregulated  mortgage  brokers don’t hold the loans and, thus, don’t have a long-
term relationship with the borrowers, so they are not concerned with their 
creditworthiness, rather they work for commissions. Since adjustable rate mortgages are 
highly profitable for banks, brokers received high commissions to generate these loans.  
  Banks’ desire for the expansion of markets (or “democratization” of credit) and 
the incentives to push adjustable rate mortgages, coupled with the tendency to overvalue 
real estate on behalf of commission-driven home appraisers, provided the foundations of 
financial instability. This was particularly true in the face of increasing default risk from 
subprime lending and unmet expectations regarding valuation of real estate assets. 
  Further, fragility is added to the system by banks that bundle mortgages into 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and sell them as a package to investment funds that 
used these MBS bundles as collateral for highly leveraged loans. The mortgages are 
                                                 
1 Minsky warned that the securitization frenzy must be countered with strict regulations because “all that 
was required for the originators to earn their stipend was skill avoiding obvious fraud and in structuring the 
package” (Minsky 1992a: 22–23).   6
bundled in varieties of risk classes, so that buyers could choose some option of perceived 
risk-to-return ratio. Furthermore, these loans were increasingly used to buy more 
mortgage bundles. This process of securitization, in particular, fits well Minsky’s 
financial instability hypothesis, as the purchase of mortgage bundles and the financial 
derivatives (such as futures and options trading) involve expectations under uncertainty 
rather than simply skillful management of probabilistic risk.  
    As a guide to the likelihood of default, the credit rating agencies rate the debt 
packages for the banks that sell them. However, the rating agencies get paid by the 
issuers of the securities, not by investors, so there is pressure to give better ratings or else 
they face the danger of losing business to other rating agencies. Investors’ motivations in 
purchasing such securitized assets were driven by optimistic expectations under 
conditions of expansion, as described by Minsky (1986, 1992a). 
With increased incidents in homeowners’ default, Minsky’s “debt-deflation” 
follows. Homes are not selling, developers are slashing prices to reduce their inventory, 
brokers are going out of business, appraisers also are negatively affected, investment 
banks are holding mortgages they cannot sell, investors are trying to sell out positions 
(assets are devalued), rating agencies are downgrading securities, and the insurers are 
facing tremendous losses. 
  In addition to the financial instability hypothesis, some authors following Keynes 
and Minsky have pointed to the institutional evolution in the U.S. financial markets—and 
specifically to the role of changes in regulations—in particular, deregulation (Kregel 
2007; Wray 2007). Most notorious is the 1999 Bank Reform Act, which allows banks to 
engage in a larger range of financial activities (blurring the distinction between 
commercial and investment banking) under a larger degree of deregulation (Kregel 
2007). Under these conditions, banks offer and promote increasingly bolder financial 
innovations. 
  Kregel specifically points to the evolution in the banker-borrower relation, where 
solvency and repayment of loans are no more the major concern for banks, since interest 
payments are displaced by fees as a source of profits. The ability of banks to earn fees for 
loan origination, while at the same time escaping the risk of default by selling the loan 
through securitization, is a major element of the current problem, as banks were not   7
concerned with repayment of the loans, but with expansion of their markets and 
generating more fee revenues by originating new loans.  
 Economic  policies that validate practices which actually contribute to financial 
fragility have also been identified as a structural problem (Wray 2007). Thus, the so-
called “affordability loans” (the adjustable rate mortgages) that were part of the 
expansion of banks’ market and strategy to obtain ever-expanding fee revenue from loan 
originations was validated by the Fed. Specifically, Greenspan encouraged homebuyers 
to undertake such loans. In addition, the acceptance of credit agencies (who represent a 
conflict of interest) as a viable valuation mechanism for risk is also a policy validation 
within the increasingly fragile financial system. 
  In addition to deregulation, globalization also plays into the current crisis. 
Globalization further stimulates the practice of securitization, as the latter creates and 
distributes financial paper across national borders. Indeed, the value of securitized 
mortgages exceeds the value of national debt held by foreign investors (Wray 2007: 7). 
Ironically, securitization has been offered as a financial innovation, which, at the macro 
level, is supposed to enhance risk management in the global economy (Bernanke 2004; 
Chancellor 2007). It was thought that MBS securitization into further collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs and CDO2) would be a good risk-sharing mechanism that would 
spread the risk too thin and would allow investors to choose investments based on their 
taste for risk. The result, however, was that all investors ended up having the same risk 
exposure, hence, spreading financial instability across the economy.  
 
C. Inequality Breeds Instability 
In The General Theory (1936), Keynes identified economic inequality as one of the major 
destabilizing features of the capitalist system. In the 1960s, Minsky poured a considerable 
amount of ink working on the so-called War on Poverty. He was convinced that job 
creation for people with any level of qualification was the only true way to fight poverty 
and inequality. In this section we argue that the ongoing subprime crisis may appear to be 
the result of recent financial innovations gone wild, but a major contributing factor to the 
conditions leading to aggressive subprime lending behavior is the build-up and 
persistence of economic inequality that has intensified since 1980 in the United States.    8
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Gini Ratio for U.S. Households (1967-2006)
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables, Households, Table H-4 
 
Between 1980 and 2004, the real average hourly wage (in 2004 dollars) hardly 
changed from its 1980 level of $15.68/hour ($15.67/hour in 2004). However, worker 
productivity has increased by 68% over the same period (United for a Fair Economy 
2006: 12). Even the federal minimum wage law has failed to lift poor working families to 
the federal poverty line. In 2007, the federal minimum wage level was 57% of the “living 
wage” (the wage that puts a family of four on the federal poverty line), down from 81% 
in 1979 and 94% in 1964. The Gini coefficient has been steadily on the rise in the United 
States since the beginning of the neoliberal era of the 1980s (graph 1). Real average 
family income has barely changed for the poorest 20% of the population between 1979 
and 2006, while the richest 20% saw their income rise by 56.77% and the richest 5% 
enjoyed an 87.47% increase (graph 2). And to make things worse for middle- and low-
income groups, U.S. tax policy took a regressive turn, shifting the burden heavily on 
those groups (graph 3). According to United for a Fair Economy, since 1980, the top 
federal tax rates on capital gains has declined by 31% and the estate tax dropped by 46%, 
while payroll tax has increased by 25% (United for a Fair Economy 2006: 23). 
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Graph 2. Real Mean Family Income Growth by Quintile and for Top 5% (1979–
2006) 
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Graph 3. Effective Federal Tax Rates (Income Tax + Payroll Tax) for the Top 1% 
and the Middle Quintile of Households (1948–2003) 
 
Source: United for a Fair Economy (2006) 
 
  By failing to recognize the destabilizing effect of economic inequality, policy 
makers at the highest level in the Federal Reserve Bank (the Fed) welcomed the situation 
as a great way to keep workers in check and prevent inflationary pressures. Testifying 
before the Senate Banking Committee in January 1997, Alan Greenspan explained that 
the gap between productivity gains and wage growth has been a blessing in disguise for 
the U.S. economy. In other words, “employment insecurity” keeps inflation down. In 
Greenspan’s words:  
 
As I see it, heightened job insecurity explains a significant part of the 
restraint on compensation and the consequent muted price inflation. 
Surveys of workers have highlighted this extraordinary state of affairs. 
In 1991, at the bottom of the recession, a survey of workers at large 
firms indicated that 25 percent feared being laid off. In 1996, despite 
the sharply lower unemployment rate and the demonstrably tighter 
labor market [. . .] 46 percent were fearful of a job layoff. (Greenspan 
1997) 
 
  Thus, Greenspan’s assessment of the cause of the “extraordinary” and 
“exceptional” U.S. economic performance in the 1990s was “a heightened sense of job   11
insecurity” that has subdued wage gains for workers. These “traumatized workers” are 
even more compliant when they have a home mortgage to pay every month and cannot 
risk loosing their home were they to go on strike or be laid off. With Greenspan’s 
blessings, workers experienced a real wage freeze, while the Fed was busy fueling the 
biggest housing bubble in U.S. history.    
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  The other side of the equation affecting homeownership is the rise in the cost of 
living, but more importantly, the cost of buying a home. Real median home prices 
fluctuated roughly between $120,000 and $140,000 (in 2008 dollars) from the mid-1970s 
to the mid-1990s. However, a sharp increase began to take place in 1996, reaching a peak 
in 2006 at nearly $248,000 (graphs 4 and 5). In short, working families have seen an 
increase in payroll taxes and more prohibitive home prices, yet no increase in income. 
The picture is bleak, but thanks to expansive financial deregulation and innovation, 
working families can still aspire to homeownership through a plethora of home mortgage 
schemes, including subprime loans. The macroeconomic financial sustainability of the 
subprime scheme depended on the sustainability of the housing bubble, namely rising 
home values and low interest rates, both of which disappeared in 2006. Initially, the vast 
majority of foreclosed homeowners did not loose their jobs; they just couldn’t keep up 
with the higher monthly mortgage payments once interest rates reset at the end of the 
teaser period.    13
  Over the last decade, the housing bubble and the artificial improvement in home 
ownership have been sustained by an extreme reliance on consumer debt given that 
disposable income was being squeezed by stagnant wages and higher taxes. Consumer 
debt to income ratio went from 65% in 1980 to nearly 80% in the mid-1990 and by 2007 
has shot up to over 125% (graph 6). Furthermore, consumer debt service burden went 
from 10.5% in 1995 to a record 14% in 2006 (graph 7).  
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank 
 
  When all the pieces of the puzzle are put together, it becomes evident that the rise 
and intensification of economic hardship on working families was not relived by tax 
breaks or higher incomes, but rather was further compounded by easy access to consumer 
debt in the form of mortgage debt, home equity lines of credit, home equity loans, and 
credit card debt. However, consumer debt can only grow so much since it must be paid 
down sooner or later. It was these destabilizing effects of inequality that led to financial 
innovation, predatory lending, and financial turmoil. 
 
III. FROM “HOMEOWNERSHIP” TO DELINQUENCY AND FORECLOSURE 
 
National delinquency and foreclosure rates have increased significantly since 2006 as 
more American homeowners find it difficult to pay their mortgage obligations. The 
proliferation of “exotic” subprime mortgage products, specifically adjustable rate 
mortgages (ARMs), during the housing boom of the past six years has been the key 
contributor to the rise in delinquencies and foreclosures.  
Subprime loans are typically made to borrowers who are deficient in either a 
strong credit history or capacity to repay their loans. The slowdown in home sales and   15
rising mortgage rates continue to drive foreclosures at substantially higher numbers than 
a year ago. Further complicating this issue is the fact that approximately two-thirds of the 
subprime mortgage debt issued between 2002 and 2004 is due to reset in 2007. Data 
compiled from the Mortgage Bankers Association corresponding to the third quarter of 
2002 to second quarter of 2007 for the United States, South Atlantic, East North Central, 
and Middle Atlantic regions show that the number of subprime loans serviced has 
increased considerably in recent years. The persistent rise of seriously delinquent and 
foreclosure rates across the United States and within specific regions reflect this surge of 
subprime loans.  
From the third quarter of 2002 to the second quarter of 2007, the growth change 
in the number of prime loans serviced fluctuated from the five year low to high (graph 8). 
Nationwide, the number of prime loans serviced reached a high of 5.4% in the third 
quarter of 2003, but this trend changed to slight decreases and modest increases until it 
remained unchanged by the end of the second quarter of 2007. The South Atlantic (SA) 
region
2 mirrored the national trend. The Middle Atlantic (MA) region
3 experienced 
modest lows and highs in the past five years. In the MA region, the number of prime 
loans serviced fell by 1.2% in the first quarter of 2003, but rose by 3.9% in the second 
quarter of 2005. The number of prime loans serviced in the MA region dropped by 1.7% 
by the end of the second quarter of 2007. The East North Central (ENC) region
4 has been 
shown to be more volatile than the other regions. Since the third quarter of 2003, the 











                                                 
2 U.S. Census Bureau defines the South Atlantic region as Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, 
Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.  
3 U.S. Census Bureau defines the Middle Atlantic region as New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. 
4 U.S. Census Bureau defines the East North Central region as Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin.   16
Graph 8. Growth Change in Prime Loans Serviced by Region, 3Q_2002 to 2Q_2007 
 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association (2007) 
 
The growth change in the number of subprime loans serviced from the third 
quarter of 2002 to the second quarter of 2007 illustrates a more persistent upward trend 
nationwide and across regions (graph 9). All regions had a surge in the number of 
subprime loans serviced in the fourth quarter of 2003. The number of loans serviced 
nationwide rose by 105.4% in the fourth quarter of 2003. Similarly, in the South Atlantic, 
Middle Atlantic, and East North Central regions, the number of subprime loans serviced 
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Graph 9. Growth Change in Subprime Loans Serviced by Region, 3Q_2002 to 
2Q_2007 
 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association (2007) 
 
Graph 10 illustrates the percentage of prime and subprime loans that are past due. 
Loans considered in this category are between 30 days and 90 days past due. The bottom 
part of the graph shows the trend in prime loans, while the upper part refers to subprime 
loans. Across the regions, the percentage of prime loans past due oscillated from 2.0% to 
3.4%. On the other hand, the percentage of subprime loans past due was much higher 
across the South Atlantic, Middle Atlantic, and East North Central regions. The 
percentage of subprime loans past due fluctuated between a low of 9.0% to a high of 
17.1%. The East North Central region had, by far, the highest percentages of subprime 
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Graph 10. Total Past Due Prime and Subprime Loans, 2Q_2002 to 2Q_2007 
 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association (2007) 
 
  Table 1 shows the seriously delinquent and foreclosure rates for prime loans 
ranking among all U.S. states, as well the national rates. In addition, it indicates the 
growth rate of the seriously delinquent and foreclosure rates from the first quarter of 2007 
to the second quarter of 2007. Seriously delinquent prime loans are those that are 90 days 
or more delinquent or in the process of foreclosure. The seriously delinquency rate is 
defined as the ratio of all seriously delinquent prime loans to all mortgage prime loans 
serviced; the same definitions apply to subprime loans. The seriously delinquent rate for 
the nation was 0.98%, while the foreclosure rate was 0.59%. In the South Atlantic region, 
West Virginia had the highest delinquency rate (1.24%), ranking the state seventh in the 
nation, while South Carolina had the highest foreclosure rate (0.72%) among its 
counterparts, raking the state ninth in the United States. In the East North Central region, 
Ohio had the highest seriously delinquent and foreclosure rate in the nation with 2.17%   19
and 1.57%, respectively. Pennsylvania, in the Middle Atlantic region, reported a seriously 
delinquency rate of 1.15%, ranking the state eleventh nationwide. Pennsylvania’s 
foreclosure rate was also the highest among the region with 0.69%, ranking the state 
fourteenth in the United States.  
 
Table 1. Seriously Delinquent, Foreclosure Rates, Ranking and Growth Rates on 
Prime Loans, 2Q_2007 
Seriously Delinquent  Foreclosure Rates 
State Rate  Ranking 
% Change 
Previous 





Delaware 1.01  19  0.30  0.71  11  0.27 
District of Columbia  0.53  43  0.06  0.27  45  0.04 
Florida 0.99  21  0.23  0.59  24  0.15 
Georgia 1.16  10  0.03  0.67  15  0.02 
Maryland 0.54  42  0.13  0.29  44  0.09 
North Carolina  0.85  29  -0.05  0.49  29  -0.03 
South Carolina  1.14  12  -0.08  0.72  9  -0.07 
Virginia 0.46  47  0.07  0.21  48  0.03 
West Virginia  1.24  7  0.13  0.69  13  0.07 
East North Central 
Illinois 1.06  14  0.03  0.72  10  0.01 
Indiana 1.91  2  -0.05  1.38  2  -0.02 
Michigan 1.86  3  0.23  1.17  3  0.18 
Ohio 2.17  1  -0.02  1.57  1  -0.01 
Wisconsin 1.02  18  0.05  0.70  12  0.02 
Middle Atlantic 
New Jersey  0.83  30  0.04  0.52  26  0.02 
New York  0.79  32  -0.02  0.49  30  -0.01 
Pennsylvania 1.15  11  -0.05  0.69  14  -0.05 
Nationwide 
United States  0.98  n/a  0.09  0.59  n/a  0.05 
  Source: Mortgage Bankers Association (2007) 
 
  Table 2 shows the seriously delinquent and foreclosure rates for subprime loans, 
ranking among all U.S. states, and the growth rate from the first quarter of 2007 to the 
second quarter of 2007. In the second quarter of 2007, the seriously delinquent rate for 
the nation was 0.98%, while the foreclosure rate was 0.59%. In the South Atlantic region, 
Georgia had the highest delinquency rate (10.11%), ranking the state fourteenth in the 
nation; South Carolina had the highest foreclosure rate (5.96%) among its counterparts 
ranking the state fourteenth in the United States. In the East North Central region, Ohio   20
once again topped the charts with the highest delinquency and foreclosure rates 
nationwide at 16.53% and 11.85%, respectively. In the Middle Atlantic region, 
Pennsylvania had the highest delinquency rate in the region with 9.74%, ranking the state 
sixteenth nationwide. New Jersey’s foreclosure rate was the highest in the region with 
5.61%, raking the state twentieth
 in the United States.  
 
Table 2. Seriously Delinquent, Foreclosure Rates, Ranking and Growth Rates on 
Subprime Loans, 2Q_2007 
Seriously Delinquent  Foreclosure Rates 
State Rate  Ranking 
% Change 
Previous 





Delaware  7.35 37 0.49  4.45 31  0.26 
District of Columbia  6.83  39  1.08  3.27  41  0.58 
Florida  8.48 27 2.19  5.29 22  1.54 
Georgia  10.11 14 0.44  5.19 24  -0.03 
Maryland  6.10 40 0.99  2.73 46  0.38 
North  Carolina  7.62 36 0.02  3.81 35  -0.31 
South  Carolina  9.94 15 0.31  5.96 14  -0.11 
Virginia  5.84 41 1.06  2.76 45  0.40 
West  Virginia  8.79 24  -0.76  3.39 39  -0.76 
East North Central 
Illinois 11.24  12  1.20  7.42  9  0.63 
Indiana  13.84 3  0.24  9.40 3 -0.17 
Michigan  16.22 2  0.39  10.09 2 -0.17 
Ohio  16.53 1  0.57  11.85 1 0.13 
Wisconsin  11.47 9  0.67  7.85 7 0.11 
Middle Atlantic 
New  Jersey  8.94 20 1.26  5.61 17  0.71 
New  York  8.57 26 1.07  5.56 19  0.69 
Pennsylvania  9.74 16  -0.11  5.37 20  -0.35 
Nationwide 
United  States  9.27 n/a  0.94  5.52 n/a  0.42 
  Source: Mortgage Bankers Association (2007) 
 
Wray and Pigeon (2000) illustrate the persistence of unemployment for a 
significant portion of the population during the Clinton-era expansion. The Clinton boom 
was a classic demand-led expansion, fueled by consumer spending and increasing 
consumer debt. The culmination of the cycle was brought to a halt with the dotcom bust 
and a subsequent reduction in consumer spending. The hardcore unemployed and the 
economically disadvantaged were simply unable to benefit from the Clinton-era   21
expansion. The 2000 recession made it difficult for the real estate market to continue its 
expansion and growth. Thankfully for the real estate market, the Fed aggressively slashed 
its fed funds rate target from 6.5% in May 2000 to 1% in June 2003, an all-time historical 
low, and kept it at that rate until June 2004. This four-year period of incredibly low 
interest rates allowed middle- and high-income consumers to refinance their homes and 
to pay off some of the debt accumulated in the 1990s. This was bad news for banks and 
real estate firms because creditworthy customers of middle- and upper-income classes 
were no longer flooding the market for homes. The next best thing were the subprime 
borrowers, those who had bad credit, then those who had no credit, then those who had 
no jobs, no income, and no assets. The lending criteria were consistently relaxed in order 
to issue the maximum amount of loans (and earn fees and commissions) that would be 
shipped off to Wall Street financial engineers for MBS and CDO packaging.   
This “boom” in homeownership and demand for homes helped jumpstart the 
residential real estate market and the economy was set for another expansion. But, as the 
economy began a modest recovery, the Fed immediately sought to bring the fed funds 
rate back to higher levels, so it began raising rates continuously starting in June 2004 to 
reach 5.25% by June 2006. The subprime time-bomb remained unnoticed thanks to the 2-
28 and 3-27 mortgage schemes in which borrowers would pay a very low rate for 2–3 
years, but then would reset at rates as high as 12%, thus leading to almost certain default 
and foreclosure. By the end of 2006, delinquencies on adjustable subprime loans began to 
rise and, by July 2007, the damage reached major financial institutions in the United 
States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. It seems that the Fed 
was still not fully aware of the extent of the crisis and had kept its target rate unchanged 
at 5.25% until September 18, 2007 when the financial crisis has fully developed.  
Ironically, the most disadvantaged group of the population had been used to 
prevent a prolonged recession in 2001 by introducing the “democratization of 
homeownership.” At the same time, the financial schemes used to promote growth sowed 
the seeds for the subprime financial meltdown. What was presented as a strategy for 
“democratizing homeownership” was, in fact, the recipe for democratizing financial 
turmoil—the taste of which, at least initially, was most bitter among the most 
disadvantaged groups.   22
Homeowners’ financial woes are not over yet. The American Bankers Association 
(ABA) reports that in the first quarter of 2008, late payments on U.S. home equity lines 
of credit soared to a 21-year high as a result of the subprime crisis. Home equity lines of 
credit delinquencies (more than 30 days past due) rose to 1.1% from 0.96% the prior 
quarter. This is the highest delinquency rate since the ABA began collecting the data in 
1987. The most recent developments leading up to the nationalization of Northern Rock 
in the United Kingdom, as well as the nationalization of AIG and mortgage giants 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in the United States confirm the growing magnitude of this 
crisis. Despite the rising U.S. exports in the first quarter of 2008, which kept GDP growth 
positive, the unemployment rate jumped to a 5-year high at 6.1% in August 2008. Higher 
unemployment (and inequality) is going to be the main catalyst for further economic 
troubles. In the next section, we outline a policy proposal to deal with the root cause of 
the subprime crisis, namely inequality.  
  
IV. EMPLOYMENT-LED REMEDY TO INEQUALITY AND FINANCIAL 
INSTABILITY 
 
Despite the popularity of Minsky’s work on the financial instability hypothesis, most of 
his work has been on issues of employment and job creation policies to fight poverty 
(Minsky 1965a,1965b). Minsky implicitly recognized the role of inequality in 
destabilizing the financial system and the economy in general. Our policy proposal here 
is nothing but an updated version of Minsky’s employer of last resort (ELR) program, 
which we suggest as the only viable solution for the real democratization of 
homeownership. Under conditions of real income growth stagnation combined with ever-
increasing real estate prices, there can be no market-based solution for boosting 
homeownership. An ELR program can guarantee a real employment opportunity for all at 
a socially established living wage (Minsky 1986a; Wray 1998; Mosler 1997–98 Forstater 
and Wray 2004).  
Minsky’s philosophy about job creation is one in which the government would 
“take workers as they are” and provide “on-the-job training” when required. Minsky’s 
aim is to have the government establish a decentralized job-creation system whereby it   23
would create an infinitely elastic demand for labor. The government would hire anyone 
who is ready, willing, and able to work. Jobs would be selected by local community 
groups and nonprofit organizations based on the social benefits to the community. The 
implementation and management of ELR projects would be locally-based, whereas 
funding would be provided by the federal government. ELR projects would be selected to 
match the skills of the local unemployment pool and would not compete with projects 
already undertaken by the private sector (or the traditional government sector). ELR 
would stabilize economic activity at full employment, so when the private sector slows 
down, the ELR administration would hire more ELR workers; as the private sector 
recovers, it can hire ELR workers away from the government at a premium above the 
ELR wage. The government therefore creates a buffer-stock of labor to stabilize wages 
and inflation. Stable employment and rising income is the only secure mechanism to 
ensure a consistent rise in homeownership.  
Most critics claim that the cost of the program would be prohibitive and that it 
would lead to massive budget deficits and rising national debt. Several reliable estimates, 
however, have shown that the cost of implementing ELR in the United States is around 
1% of GDP (Gordon 1997; Majewski and Nell 2000; Majewski 2004; and Fullwiler 
2007). The establishment of an ELR program would also produce substantial cost 
savings, as it would make several government assistance programs redundant. The cost of 
implementing ELR is, by far, lower than the trillions of dollars that are being spent now 
on government bailouts of Wall Street firms. Job guarantee ensures that homeowners can 
qualify for affordable loans and that they don’t miss any mortgage payments, which, in 
turn, ensures the stability of the mortgage-backed securities market. ELR doesn’t 
eliminate inequality all together, but it puts a floor to income and aggregate demand 
levels. Furthermore, ELR introduces a sense of security and confidence, so it stabilizes 
expectations. When employment is guaranteed, consumers and businesses can engage in 
long-term planning based on stable aggregate demand.  
The establishment of ELR would also require a substantial coordination of fiscal 
and monetary policies between the Fed and the Treasury to ensure the establishment of 
full employment and price stability simultaneously. The financing of the program would 
be done in the same way as any other government program. Government spending injects   24
reserves into the economy, then taxes or bond sales would withdraw excess reserves from 
the system, thus preventing inflationary pressures and keeping overnight interest rates at 
the desired policy target. There can be no financing constraint on the monopoly issuer of 
the currency. A financially sovereign government has the ability to finance any economic 
activity it wishes to undertake, since it can issue debt denominated in the sovereign’s own 
currency and collect taxes in that same currency. According to the basic principles of 
functional finance, the ELR program will add to the annual deficit and the national debt, 
but those levels are just accounting indications of the private sector’s desire to net save 
and do not represent any financial burden on the government. It is the function of the 
deficit and the national debt that matters, not their levels. The desired function here is to 
address the root cause of the financial crisis (i.e., income inequality) through a job 
guarantee program. Without an ELR program, all other attempts at improving 
homeownership will remain artificial and, therefore, temporary at best. The massive 
government bailout of Wall Street firms, though necessary, is yet another temporary 
patch to the system and does not deal with the root cause of the problem.  
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  
The paper presented a critique of the ill-conceived policies of increasing homeownership 
in the United States. We explained the subprime crisis with Minsky’s financial instability 
hypothesis. The system according to Minsky is inherently unstable. Financial crises are 
not the result of irrational exuberance, but rather deep structural flaws that are inherent to 
capitalist systems. We identified that inequality has been the main structural cause of the 
subprime crisis. When aggregate demand began to fall in the late 1990s as over-indebted 
consumers began to slow their borrowing, the real estate lending frenzy went after 
subprime borrowers with exotic lending schemes to put a temporary patch on inequality, 
claiming the “democratization of homeownership.” The scheme spread to Wall Street 
through securitization. The highly complicated structured investment vehicles have 
consequently become too illiquid and almost impossible to value, and have turned into 
toxic assets on the balance sheets of all major financial institutions.     25
We argue that fixing the financial crisis through a bailout of any sort will, at best, 
restore temporary financial stability and will not address the root cause of the problem. 
We propose attacking the problem at its roots through a job guarantee program that 
ensures that homeowners have access to a decent employment opportunity. This would 
help homeowners keep their homes and provide stability to real estate values, thus 
indirectly stabilizing the mortgage-backed securities market and financial markets in 
general. The data illustrates the extent to which inequality over the last four decades has 
built up an economic iceberg with stagnant income, rising cost of living and home prices, 
and little or no real assistance for low-income homebuyers. The subprime lending 
schemes with cheap money financing came as a fictitious and temporary remedy for low-
income groups seeking homeownership. The mirage disappeared as interest rates rose, 
cheap financing disappeared, and home values plummeted. The end result was a 
“democratization of financial turmoil” rather than “democratization of homeownership.”  
The proposed $700 billion government bailout of Wall Street will only set the 
system up for another financial crisis down the road if it is not supplemented with a 
comprehensive plan to restore income growth and debt relief for middle- and low-income 
groups. The most efficient and productive way to do this is through a job guarantee 
program à la Minsky, which will achieve full employment, price stability, financial 
stability, rising standards of living, and increased actual homeownership.  
 
 
   26
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Bernanke, Ben S. 2004. “The Great Moderation.” Speech given at the meeting of the 
Eastern Economic Association, February 20. Washington, DC. 
 
Chancellor, Edward. 2007. “Ponzi Nation.” Institutional Investor, February 7. 
 
Forstater, Mathew, and L. Randall Wray. 2004. “Full Employment and Social Justice.” in 
Champlin and Knodler (eds.), The Institutionalist Tradition in Labor Economics. 
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 
 
Fullwiler, Scott T. 2007. “Macroeconomic Stabilization through an Employer of Last 
Resort.” Journal of Economic Issues 41(1): 93–134. 
 
Gordon, Wendell. 1997. “Job Assurance: The Job Guarantee Revisited.” Journal of 
Economic Issues 32(3): 826–834. 
 
Greenspan, Alan. 1997. “Statements to Congress—Statements by Alan Greenspan to the 
Senate Committee on the Budget and the Senate Committee on Finance, U.S. 
Senate, January 21, 1997.” Federal Reserve Bulletin (March).  
 
Kaboub, Fadhel. 2007a. “Employment Guarantee Programs: A Survey of Theories and 
Policy Experiences.” Working Paper 498. Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: The Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College. 
 
————. 2007b. “Institutional Adjustment Planning for Full Employment.” Journal of 
Economic Issues 41(2): 495–502. 
 
Keynes, John M. 1936. The General Theory of Unemployment, Interest, and Money. New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc. 
 
Kregel, Jan. 2007. “Minsky’s Cushions of Safety: Systemic Risk and the Crisis in the 
U.S. Subprime Mortgage Market.” Public Policy Brief 93. Annandale-on-Hudson, 
NY: The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. 
 
Lahart, Justin. 2007. “In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency.” The Wall 
Street Journal, August 18. 
 
Majewski, Raymond. 2004. “Simulating an Employer of Last Resort Program.” in 
Argyrous, Forstater, and Mongiovi (eds.), Growth, Distribution, and Effective 
Demand: Alternatives to Economic Orthodoxy, Essays in Honor of Edward J. 
Nell. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc. 
 
 
   27
Majewski, Raymond, and Edward J. Nell. 2000. “Maintaining Full Employment: 
Simulating an Employer of Last Resort Program.” Seminar Paper No. 6. Kansas 
City, MO: Center for Full Employment and Price Stability (CFEPS). Available at: 
http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/sp/sp6.html   
 
Minsky, Hyman P. 2008. “Securitization.” Policy Note 2. Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: 
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. 
 
————. 1992a. “Reconstituting the United States’ Financial Structure: Some 
Fundamental Issues.” Working Paper 69. Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: The Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College. 
 
————. 1992b. “The Financial Instability Hypothesis.” Working Paper 74. Annandale-
on-Hudson, NY: The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. 
 
————. 1986a. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
 
————. 1986b. “Global Consequences of Financial Deregulation.” in Gary Clyde 
Hufbauer (ed.), The Marcus Wallenberg Papers on International Finance, 
Volume 2, Number 1. Washington, DC: Georgetown University. 
 
————. 1965a. “The Role of Employment Policy.” in M.S. Gordon (ed.), Poverty in 
America. San Francisco: Chandler. 
 
————. 1965b. “Labor and the War Against Poverty.” The Center for Labor Research 
and Education. Berkley, CA: Institute of Industrial Relations. 
 
Mortgage Bankers’ Association. 2007. National Delinquency Survey, 2nd Quarter.  
 
Mosler, Warren B. 1997–98. “Full Employment and Price Stability.” Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics 20(2): 167–182. 
 
The White House. 2004. “President George W. Bush: A Remarkable Record of 
Achievement.” August. Washington, DC. Available at:  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/achievement/Achievement.pdf  
 
The White House. 2002. “President Calls for Expanding Opportunities to Home 
Ownership.” June 17. Washington, DC. Available at:  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020617-2.html 
 
United for a Fair Economy. 2006. “The Growing Divide: Inequality and the Roots of 
Economic Insecurity.” October. Available at: www.faireconomy.org 
   28
Whalen, Charles. 2007. “The U.S. Credit Crunch of 2007: A Minsky Moment.” Public 
Policy Brief 92. Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: The Levy Economics Institute of 
Bard College. 
 
Wray, L. Randall, and Marc-Andre Pigeon. 2000. “Can a Rising Tide Raise All Boats? 
Evidence from the Clinton-era Expansion.” Journal of Economic Issues 34(4): 
811–845. 
 
Wray, L. Randall. 2007. “Lessons from the Subprime Meltdown.” Working Paper 522. 
Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. 
 
————. 1998. “Zero Unemployment and Stable Prices.” Journal of Economic Issues 
32(2): 539–546. 